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Abstract. In this paper we reconsider Pretty Good Democracy, a scheme
for verifiable Internet voting from untrusted client machines. The orig-
inal scheme worked for first-past-the-post elections. Here we show how
PGD can be extended to voting schemes in which the voter lists the
candidates in their order of preference. Our scheme applies to elections
using STV, IRV, Borda, or any other tallying scheme in which a vote is
a list of candidates in preference order. We also describe an extension
to Approval or Range voting.
1 Introduction
Secure Internet voting wouldn’t be difficult at all, if only the authorities
tallying the election were perfectly trustworthy, nobody ever attempted
to influence another person’s vote, and every home PC was perfectly se-
cure. Unfortunately, all of these problems remain open. There are various
schemes for Internet voting [JCJ05, Adi08], which use cryptography to
weaken or eliminate (some of) these assumptions. Here we concentrate
on Pretty Good Democracy [RT09], which has the great advantage over
other schemes of providing a proof of correct tallying while placing no
trust whatsoever in the device used to cast the vote. (It has the conse-
quent disadvantage of weaker coercion-resistance and integrity guarantees
than some other schemes—see [RT09].)
The first version of PGD [RT09] was designed for elections in which
the voter chose a single favourite candidate. However, many countries
and many other organisations use voting schemes requiring the voter to
list several (or all) candidates in their order of preference. For example,
the Single Transferable Vote scheme (STV) is used in national elections
in Australia, Ireland, Malta and Scotland. Instant Runoff Voting (IRV),
which is the single-vacancy version of STV, is used in some local elections
in the USA, the UK, Australia, and many other countries. The Borda
Count is used in certain political elections in Slovenia, and also in many
other organisations, such as the Eurovision Song Contest. In this paper
we extend PGD to allow voters to express their vote as a list of candidates
in preference order. Any method could then be used to tally the votes,
including existing solutions for the secure tallying of Borda [CM05] or
STV/IRV votes [BMN+09, Hea07, TRN08] . We present several different
schemes, one of which also encompasses Approval Voting or Range Voting,
in which the voter gives a score to all candidates.
In Section 2 we review PGD 1.0 and explain why the obvious ex-
tension to more complex voting schemes doesn’t work. The next three
sections each contain a different extension with a discussion of pros and
cons. In Section 3 the simplest method (Protocol A) is described, which
is simple and secure but suffers from the disadvantage that each prefer-
ence requires a separate interaction with the authorities. Protocol B, in
Section 4, has the simplest voting experience, but somewhat complicated
acknowledgement checking. Protocol C, in Section 5, is an approach based
on a two-dimensional table, which allows votes that are ordered lists or
approval or range votes.
1.1 Protocol Comparison
Figure 1 contains a comparison of the three protocols. “Single-step vot-
ing” means that casting a vote requires only one interaction with the
authorities. “Single ack” means that there is only one Ack code—this is
important because it means that the protocol is receipt-free even against a
coercer who observes the ack return directly. “Number of preferences hid-
den on BB” means that observers can’t tell from the bulletin board how
many preferences each voter cast. This is sometimes important, because
different jurisdictions have very different rules about how many prefer-
ences may or must be cast. Being able to check via the bulletin board is a
useful feature for demonstrating vote validity, though it may make voters
vulnerable to being coerced into casting fewer (or more) peferences than
they wished.
Security properties Like PGD 1.0, all the protocols in this paper are
receipt-free but not coercion-resistant—a voter can sell her code sheet
before voting, but cannot prove after voting what vote she cast. The
protocols with a single ack (A and C) are receipt-free even against a
coercer who directly observes the ack return. Protocol B is receipt-free
Protocol A B C
Single-step voting × X X
Single Ack X × X
Number of preferences hidden on BB X × ×
Approval or Range Votes × × X
Fig. 1. Comparison of protocol features
only if the voter has a chance to generate a fake ack code list before the
coercer observes it.
In all cases, it takes either a leak of the printed code sheet or a col-
lusion of a threshold number of trustees (which, by assumption, cannot
occur) to derive an appropriate Ack Code without the vote being prop-
erly registered on the bulletin board. The assumptions behind integrity
are described in Table 2, in which “no” is good and “yes” is bad.
Vote can be undetectably manipulated by: A B C
Cheating client who doesn’t know the codes No No No
Cheating client who knows the codes Yes No Yes
Cheating client who knows the codes and the
order of the candidates on the code sheet n/a Yes n/a
Fig. 2. Comparison of protocol security properties
2 Review of PGD
Like other forms of Code Voting [Cha01], PGD assumes that each voter
receives a Code Sheet, which is a list of candidate names and correspond-
ing Vote Codes. An example is given in Figure 3.
Each voter sends the Vote Code for their chosen candidate to the
central Vote Server. They could use any networked device for the trans-
mission, including a home PC or mobile phone. Even a corrupted de-
vice is unable to substitute a different choice of candidate, because it
does not learn the other codes. After sending the Vote Code, the voter
waits to receive an acknowledgement code. In the original Code Voting
scheme [Cha01], the printed code sheet contained a separate Ack Code
for each candidate. In PGD [RT09] we argued that one Ack code per code
sheet sufficed. Either way, the purpose of the Ack is to demonstrate to the
voter that they communicated with the correct server and that it received
Candidate Vote Code
Red 3772
Green 4909
Chequered 9521
Fuzzy 7387
Cross 2531
Ack Code: 8243
Ballot ID: 3884092844
Fig. 3. Example Vote Codes
the correct Vote Code. In PGD there was then a computer-verifiable proof
of correct tallying, which could be publicised on a bulletin board.
The key innovation of the PDG scheme is that, in order to access
the correct ack code, the voter server must invoke the cooperation of a
threshold set of Trustees. The revealing of the correct ack code is thus a
side-effect of the correct registration of a valid code.
2.1 Overview of ballot construction
The roles of the authorities in PGD are:
– A Voting Authority VA who generates the requisite number of vote
codes and ack codes encrypted under the Trustees’ public key, PKT .
– A set of Clerks, who generate encrypted Vote Codes for each ballot,
one version for the Bulletin Board and one for the printed code sheets.
– A Registrar who decrypts the ballots provided by the Clerks and prints
the code sheets.
– A Returning Officer who distributes the code sheets to the voters.
– A Voting Server, who receives the votes, then posts the ballot ID
and the encrypted vote code on the Bulletin Board along with a Zero
Knowledge proof of knowledge of the plaintext.
– A set of Trustees, who work with the Voting Server to register the
votes on the Bulletin Board and reveal the ack codes. They have
shares of the secret key corresponding to the threshold public key,
PKT .
– A set of Auditors responsible for performing various types of audit,
on the initial set-up, on the information posted to the Bulletin Board,
e.g. the zero knowledge proofs, and verifying the anonymising mixes.
All of this is done on the bulletin board, except obviously the Registrar’s
decryption of the ballots and the distribution of the code sheets to voters.
For details of ballot interpretation, tallying and audit, see [RT09]. Briefly,
the Clerks generate the encrypted ballots by successive shuﬄing, the en-
crypted Vote Codes are matched via plaintext equivalence tests, and the
rest of the tallying is similar to Preˆt a` Voter. In this paper we present
two protocols with single ack codes that can be published on the bulletin
board, and one protocol with an ordered list of ack codes that must be
decrypted and returned to the voter secretly.
2.2 An obvious extension to preference voting that doesn’t
work
The simplest extension would be for the voter simply to list their vote
codes in preference order, and wait for the (single) return Ack. However,
this is insecure because a cheating client or VS could simply rearrange
the codes undetectably.
3 Protocol A: The simple solution
Another possibility is to use distinct Ack codes for each candidate, sent
secretly to the voter in addition to the public one that is posted on the
bulletin board (see Section 9.3 of [RT09]). The voter would have to send
in each code in turn, then wait for the appropriate Ack to be received
before sending in the next code, and so on.
3.1 Discussion
This is a secure and simple solution—it is impossible for a cheating client
to switch vote codes or candidate acks undetectably, and it is easy for the
voter to understand why. Its only shortcoming is that it could take some
time for the authorities to generate and return the acks, during which
time the voter has to wait. Furthermore, the security is undermined if a
malicious client machine successfully persuades the voter to enter all their
vote codes in one go without waiting for the intermediate acks, because
the client could then apply the same rearrangement to both the vote codes
and the ack codes.
4 Protocol B: Returning the Acknowledgement Codes in
ballot order
In this protocol, the voter is provided with a set of preference codes as well
as voting codes. Furthermore, the order of the candidates is randomised
on each code sheet in the manner of Preˆt a` Voter. Voting is a simple
matter of sending in the vote codes in order of preference. The return
acknowledgement should be a list of preference codes in the order the
candidates appear on the code sheet. This is computed by the authorities
without requiring any voter interaction. The main drawbacks with this
are that it may be difficult for voters to understand how to check their
acknowledgement codes, and that the integrity guarantee is not as strong
as in the previous solution.
4.1 Security properties
For the scheme in Section 3, a cheating client or VS couldn’t rearrange
the vote without knowing the vote codes in advance. In that section, we
could list the candidates on the code sheet in a canonical order. In this
section each code sheet will have the candidates listed in a secret, random
order. Our main security claim is:
Claim. A cheating client or VS (who doesn’t know the codes) can swap
two preferences undetectably only if it knows which two positions on the
code sheet they correspond to.
A proof of this claim is contained in Section 4.4.
4.2 Voter Interface
The idea is to give each voter a code sheet with two lists of codes:
– a list of candidate codes in a random, secret order, and
– a list of preference codes in preference order.
The idea is that the voter submits their candidate codes in their or-
der of preference, and receives as acknowledgement a list of preference
codes in the order the candidates appear on their code sheet. For ex-
ample, for the code sheet given in Figure 3, the voter might wish to
vote “Chequered, Fuzzy, Green, Red, Cross”, so they would enter codes
9521, 7387, 4909, 3772, 2531 in sequence. At this point they have finished
casting their vote, and if they are not interested in verifying their vote,
they do not need to interact with the system any further.
They would then expect as acknowledgement a list of preference codes
given in the order the candidates are printed on the code sheet. For the
example preference codes in Figure 4, the first would be codeW , (because
Red is the first candidate in the order printed on the ballot paper, and the
Preference Ack Code
1st K
2nd T
3rd C
4th W
5th M
Ballot ID: 3884092844
Fig. 4. Example Preference Codes
preference given to it was 4th), then C,K, T,M . Thus the voter should
expect to receive the acknowledgement: WCKTM .
To assist the voter, we could provide a blank column alongside the
candidate list. The voter writes the appropriate preference code for each
candidate alongside the candidate. Then the acknowledgement code will
be the sequence of letters read down the column.
4.3 Details of ballot construction, acknowledgement and
tallying
Notation If σ and pi are permutations on n items, then σ ◦ pi is the
permutation defined by (σ◦pi)(i) = σ(pi(i)). If L is a (possibly encrypted)
list, then Li denotes the i-th element of L. Denote by pi(L) the idea of
“applying” a permutation pi to a list L, which means taking each element
Li in turn and copying it into position pi(i) in the new list. The result is
pi(L) = Lpi−1(1), . . . , Lpi−1(n). It follows that the result of applying pi and
then σ to L is (σ ◦ pi)(L) = Lpi−1(σ−1(1)), . . . , Lpi−1(σ−1(n)).
[x] means encrypted x. Actually, almost everything is encrypted, so
the [] notation is just a reminder.
Building Blocks Numerous protocols exist for proving a shuﬄe of a
list of ciphertexts. In [Ram09], efficient protocols are given for proving
that the same shuﬄe has been applied to several lists, even if they are
encrypted under different public keys. We will call this protocol Shuf-par.
Ballot Construction: The Bulletin-Board part We use a distributed
ballot construction similar to that of PGD. Obviously we need full per-
mutations rather than cyclic shifts. For each vote ID we need to produce a
printed code sheet as described above. There are four different authorities,
each of which could be performed by a single (trustworthy) individual, or
(preferably) distributed among several.
1. The ballot-construction authorities produce the codes and a randomly-
arranged encrypted version of each code sheet, on the bulletin board.
2. the code-sheet authority randomly reshuﬄes and then prints the code
sheets. (The shuﬄing and decrypting can be distributed using stan-
dard techniques, but the printing is more difficult to distribute.)
3. the PET authorities share the key with which the Vote Codes are
encrypted. They perform distributed PET tests on the bulletin board
to register each vote.
4. the decryption authorities share the key for decrypting the candidate
names in each vote.
To avoid cluttering the text we drop the indices that indicate the
row, and corresponding code sheet, and just describe the set up w.r.t. a
typical row. Let ci be the i-th candidate, and V Ci the i-th vote code. The
ballot-construction authorities begin by constructing, for each vote, and
displaying on the BB:
1. A list VC of encrypted (ci, V Ci) pairs in a canonical order,
2. A re-encrypted version of VC with each row shuﬄed by a secret ran-
dom order ρ.
ρ(VC) = ([cρ−1(1)], [V Cρ−1(1)]),
. . . ,
([cρ−1(n)], [V Cρ−1(n)])
Each row of this table has to be decrypted and the information printed
on a code sheet. Note that the candidates will be printed in the in
the order given, i.e. according to the ρ permutation encoded in this
sequence.
3. A table PC of encrypted preference codes in order is also posted to
the Bulletin Board. Each row will correspond to a code sheet and will
have the form:
PC = [PC1], . . . , [PCn]
Code Sheet construction: The secret part We now add encryptions
of {1, ..., n} in order to each of the rows of the VC table. Thus each element
of the table is now a triple and each row has the form:
VC′ = ([1], [cρ−1(1)], [V Cρ−1(1)]), . . . , ([n], [cρ−1(n)], [V Cρ−1(n)])
Another set of authorities called the Code Sheet authorities then per-
form further shuﬄes within each row of the Vote Codes, by another secret,
parallel, random permutation σi, where i indexes the row in question. The
protocol of [Ram09] is used here to ensure that the triples are preserved
in these shuﬄes. The output of this is posted to the Bulletin Board.
The result of this will be a new table VC∗ in which each row has the
form:
VC∗ = ([σ−1(1)], [cρ−1◦σ−1(1)], [V Cρ−1◦σ−1(1)]), . . . , ([σ−1(n)], [cρ−1◦σ−1(n)], [V Cρ−1◦σ−1(n)])
This table will be posted to the Bulletin Board and used to register
the votes. Notice that the order in which the candidates, and the vote
codes, appear is different to that that appears on the code sheets, in fact
differs by the secret σ permutation. This is crucial to ensure that the
scheme is receipt-free.
The authorities are also required to show their workings on the Bul-
letin Board to allow for auditing.
Ack computation and return When a vote V arrives with the Trustees
(from the VS) it’s an encrypted list of vote codes in preference order:
V = ([V Cpi−1(1)], . . . , [V Cpi−1(n)])
. For convenience we will assume throughout this section that each vote
is a complete list of preferences, i.e. a list of all the candidates. However,
partial lists could easily be accommodated, though the tallying would
reveal how many preferences had been expressed. This issue is discussed
further in Section 5.
The authorities construct the tallyable vote T and the acknowledge-
ment list A on the BB as follows: For j = 1 to n:
1. Do PET tests comparing the vote V with the list VC∗ from the bulletin
board.4 When [Vj ] matches [VC∗]i, this means that pi−1(j) = ρ−1 ◦
σ−1(i), so candidate [cρ−1◦σ−1(i)] gets preference j.
(a) Vote Updating: Put [cρ−1◦σ−1(i)] into the vote T at preference
j. (For example, T could just be a list of candidate names in order,
in which case all we do is add [cρ−1◦σ−1(i)] into the list T in the j-th
4 Note that σ ◦ ρ is secret, i.e. not the permutation that’s printed on the code sheets,
so this does not reveal anything about the vote. If a party knows σ ◦ ρ, or knows
σ and has the code sheet, they can learn the vote from this step, which is a good
reason to have ρ and σ generated by a series of shuﬄers.
place.) Since [cρ−1◦σ−1(i)] is still encrypted, nobody knows which
candidate actually got preference j.
(b) Ack code updating: To construct the correct acknowledgement
code, the Trustees extract [σ−1(i)] from [VC∗i] and append to A
the term
([σ−1(i)], [PCj ])
2. Once all the terms in the row have been registered and ranked we
have a sequence of pairs of the form:
([σ−1(i)], [PCj ]), for i = 1, . . . , n
in which pi−1(j) = ρ−1 ◦ σ−1(i). Now the preference codes must be
arranged in the correct order, corresponding to the order shown on
the code sheet. We want to do this in a way that does not result on
the Trustees, or anyone, learning the σ shuﬄe. We can accomplish this
as follows: the Trustees each perform a secret parallel shuﬄe on the
sequence, i.e. preserving the pairings. Once this is done, a threshold
set of the Trustees decrypt all the terms. The preference codes are
now arranged into the order of the first terms.
To see that this arranges the preference codes in the correct order,
let τ be the composition of the Trustees’ random shuﬄes in the last step.
Then the list before τ is applied is
([σ−1(i)], [PCpi◦ρ−1◦σ−1(i)]), for i = 1, . . . , n
Applying τ give us
([σ−1 ◦ τ−1(i)], [PCpi◦ρ−1◦σ−1◦τ−1(i)]), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Rearranging by first element gives us
([i], [PCpi◦ρ−1(i)]), for i = 1, . . . , n
which is exactly the result of rearranging the preference codes according
to inverse of the vote, pi−1, then rearranging them again according to ρ,
the order they are printed on their code sheet.
Tallying Since the votes are simply lists of encrypted candidate names in
preference order, there are many possible tallying options depending on
the voting scheme and on the degree of privacy required. Any of the secure
tallying protocols for STV/IRV or Borda mentioned in the introduction
could be implemented here.
4.4 Proofs of correctness
Basic proof of correctness It should already be clear, but is important
to state, that when everyone follows the protocol the votes are cast and
counted as the voter intended.
Lemma 1. When all authorities follow the protocol correctly, the vote
registered is the same as the permutation applied by the voter to the Vote
Codes, which is also the same as the vote implied by the acknowledging
preference codes.
Proof. By construction. uunionsq
Proof of security against a cheating client We claimed at the begin-
ning of this section that a malicious client could not undetectably cast a
modified vote, except given extra information. Here we restate the claim
and sketch a proof.
Claim. A cheating client or VS (who doesn’t know the codes) can swap
two preferences undetectably only if it knows which two positions on the
code sheet they correspond to.
Proof. Starting assumptions:
1. Each ballot ID gets only one registered vote and ack code list.
2. Each vote is a complete permutation.
3. The VS can derive no information from the Ack Codes.
In the worst case the client knows exactly what vote the voter wants
to cast. We will assume this worst-case adversary and show that it can
rearrange the preference acks correctly only if it knows the corresponding
positions on the ballot.
Suppose the voter intends to cast vote V , a permutation of the candi-
date names. The cheating client swaps preferences i and j, which means
swapping the i-th and j-th items in the list of Vote Codes (or candi-
date names), and submits the modified vote instead. It receives from the
trustees a (cleartext) list of preference codes P arranged in the order
the candidates appear on the code sheet. This list differs from what the
voter is expecting only in that the codes for the i-th and j-th preferences
must be swapped. Since the cheating VS knows which candidate names
these correspond to, swapping them correctly implies knowing which (un-
ordered) two locations on the code sheet they occupy. uunionsq
Proof of privacy We wish to show that the vote construction step on
the bulletin board preserves vote privacy. Obviously only computational
privacy is achieved, because both the vote codes and the ordered candi-
date names are shown, encrypted, on the bulletin board.
The weakest point for maintaining voter privacy is in the printing
and distribution of the code sheets. If we assume that that phase doesn’t
leak information, the distributed ballot construction implies that ρ and
σ remain secret if both:
1. At least one of the ballot construction authorities keeps their compo-
nent permutation secret, and
2. Fewer than a threshold number of decryption trustees collude.
The following lemma shows that even an adversary who knows some
information about this voter’s preferences, and who can see the code
sheet, learns nothing (more) from observing the bulletin board. The proof
is in Appendix 6.1
Lemma 2. The bulletin board proof can be simulated to produce a tran-
script computationally indistinguishable from the true one, even by an
adversary who observes the code sheet.
5 Protocol C: Two-dimensional tables
In this section each voter receives a two-dimensional table. Each row
represents a candidate, each column a number. The numbers could be
ranks for STV, Borda or IRV votes, as shown in Figure 5, or they could
be scores for Range or Approval voting, as shown in Figure 6. Compared
to Protocol B, this has more complicated vote casting but much simpler
Ack checking.
Candidate 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Red 37 90 12 08 72
Green 14 46 88 49 09
Chequered 95 10 21 83 20
Fuzzy 33 99 21 73 87
Cross 39 25 31 11 92
Ack Code: 8243
Ballot ID: 3884092844
Fig. 5. Example of Candidate and Preference Codes
Candidate Approve Disapprove
Red 37 72
Green 49 09
Chequered 95 21
Fuzzy 73 87
Cross 25 31
Ack Code: 8243
Ballot ID: 3884092844
Fig. 6. Example of Candidate and Approval/Disapproval Codes
For each candidate, the voter selects the code in the appropriate col-
umn, which the client then sends to the vote server. As in PGD 1.0, each
voter receives a single ack, and the security of the scheme is dependent
upon the secrecy of the Vote Codes and Ack code.
5.1 Details of ballot construction, ack return and tallying
Ballot construction Ballot construction and ack return are much sim-
pler than the corresponding construction in Protocol C. On the code
sheets and on the Bulletin Board, the candidates can remain in canonical
order throughout. For each ballot, for each candidate, the authorities post
to the Bulletin Board
– an encrypted Ack Code, and
– for each canonically ordered candidate, a list of encrypted (Vote Code,
number) pairs in a secret, random order.
There are two slightly different versions depending on the kind of
voting.
– For Range or Approval Voting, each vote code list is shuﬄed indepen-
dently. This makes it impossible to tell how many candidates received
the same number.
– for STV, IRV, or Borda, the same shuﬄe is applied to the code list of
every candidate on the same ballot. This makes it easy to check the
validity of each vote: anything with at most one PET match in each
column is valid, because it has no repeated preferences.5
In either case, the table should be printed on the code sheet in canonical
order, while the order(s) on the bulletin board remain secret.
5 We are assuming here that votes are valid if they skip preferences, but not if they re-
peat a preference. If another rule were applied then an appropriate validity checking
step would have to be added later.
Tallying Again Plaintext Equivalence tests are used to match each
Voter’s encrypted Vote Codes with those on the Bulletin Board. When
the submitted Vote Code matches (V Cij ,numberj), this implies that can-
didate i (who is known from the canonical order) “gets” number numberj
(which is still encrypted). The correct interpretation of this depends on
the voting scheme.
Approval or Range Voting, or Borda Count For voting schemes that sim-
ply accumulate a score for each candidate, the tallying is simple. Using
an encryption scheme with homomorphic addition, numberj can simply
be added to candidate i’s total without being decrypted. Of course the
scores have to be set up correctly in advance, with, for example, 1 and 0
for approval and disapproval respectively in AV, and n − j for the j-th
preference in Borda. This is straightforward.
Lists of preferences: STV or IRV If the straightforward PET matching
is done on the bulletin board, it reveals how many preferences each voter
expressed. This protects against a cheating client or VS who submits only
a subset of the complete preference list, but unfortunately it also violates
each voter’s privacy to some extent. In many instances, this would be a
serious problem because it could allow a coercer to demand that a voter
restrict the number of preferences they expressed. However, in the case
where everyone must list the same number of preferences, all valid votes
would be indistinguishable. This is fairly common in Australia, where
often a permuation has to be complete to be valid, and it also occurs
in the United States, where IRV with about 3 compulsory preferences is
sometimes used.
Tallying for IRV or STV is complex. So far, for each vote, we have
produced a list of candidate names (in canonical order) with their corre-
sponding (encrypted) rank. There are (at least) two possible options:
– Shuﬄe all the votes in this form and then decrypt them at the end.
This would give the correct answer but possibly expose the voters to
pattern-matching attacks (a.k.a. “Italian” Attacks) as described by
Heather [Hea07] (and others).
– Apply the Shuﬄe-Sum protocol [BMN+09], possibly with a prepro-
cessing step to deal with votes that skip some preferences.
5.2 Proofs of correctness for Protocol C
This protocol is considerably simpler than Protocol B, which is reflected
in the relative simplicity of the assumptions and proofs.
Basic proof of correctness Again, when everyone follows the protocol
the votes are cast and counted as the voter intended.
Lemma 3. When all authorities follow Protocol C correctly, the vote reg-
istered corresponds to the rows and columns chosen on the code sheet.
Proof. By construction. uunionsq
Proof of security against a cheating client We would like to argue
that a cheating client or VS cannot alter a vote undetectably, but it is
important to clarify “undetectably.” So far in this paper the voter has
been able to detect vote manipulation by the absence of the expected
ack code(s). The same will be true here, unless the cheating client or VS
submits a subset of the (V Cij ,numberj) pairs, which is detectable only
if the voter checks the bulletin board (presumably via an independent
device). As explained above, this is not a problem in schemes in which the
number of pairs is specified, such as AV with compulsory explicit approval
or disapproval of each candidate, or IRV with exactly three preferences.
Claim. A cheating client or VS (who doesn’t know the codes) cannot add
valid (candidate, number) pairs.
Proof. Achieving a successful PET test requires either knowledge of the
relevant code or collusion of a threshold number of decryption authorities.
uunionsq
Claim. A cheating client or VS (who doesn’t know the codes) cannot
remove (candidate, number) pairs without this being observable on the
bulletin board.
Proof. The bulletin board reveals how many pairs were registered for each
vote. uunionsq
Proof of privacy As in Section 4.4 we wish to show that the data
on the bulletin board preserve (computational) vote privacy. Again we
assume that that code sheet printing phase doesn’t leak information, that
at least one of the ballot construction authorities keeps their component
permutations secret, and that ewer than a threshold number of decryption
trustees collude.
Lemma 4. The bulletin board proof can be simulated to produce a tran-
script computationally indistinguishable from the true one, even by an
adversary who observes the code sheet.
Proof. Omitted, but very similar to that of Lemma 2.
6 Discussion
6.1 Social engineering attacks on voters
These protocols are designed so that even a completely corrupted device
is unable to alter a voter’s choices undetectably, assuming that the voter
follows the protocol perfectly. Since the voter probably votes infrequently,
and trusts the computer for voting instructions, the assumption of per-
fect voter behaviour might be easy to undermine. For example, a virus
that presented an appealing window with instructions like, “please enter
the candidate names and vote codes in the order they appear on your
code sheet,” (for Protocol 3), or “please enter all the numbers in both
tables,” (for Protocol 2) would probably succeed with most voters. Given
that information it would then be able to cast whatever vote it chose
and manipulate the returning acknowledgement codes correctly to avoid
detection. Although these kinds of attacks also work on other versions of
code voting, our protocols are considerably more complicated and have
more subtle privacy assumptions than the others, and hence are probably
more vulnerable.
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A Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. The bulletin board proof from Protocol B can be simulated to
produce a transcript computationally indistinguishable from the true one,
even by an adversary who observes the code sheet.
Proof. The new information revealed on the bulletin board is the pattern
of which elements of (σ ◦ρ)(VC) match which elements of the vote V. The
whole transcript for one voter can be simulated, given the PET matching
sequence, as follows:
1. Generate a preference order pi. This can be done according to any pre-
existing information about the distribution of this voter’s preferences.
2. Re-encrypt VC (the canonically-ordered Vote Codes) and rearrange
them according to pi. Call this V.
3. Re-encrypt VC again and arrange it according to the order, ρ, shown
on the code sheet.6 Call the result ρ(VC).
4. Re-encrypt ρ(VC) again and rearrange it according to the sequence of
matching PETs. Call the result σ ◦ ρ(VC).
5. For each matching PET, simulate the transcript.
6. Simulate the shuﬄes that produce ρ(VC) and σ ◦ ρ(VC).
7. Perform vote and ack construction exactly as in the real protocol.
The transcript produced here is computationally indistinguishable
from the true transcript, even in the presence of the code sheet. uunionsq
6 To show privacy against an adversary who doesn’t have the code sheet, ρ could be
generated uniformly here.
